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INTERSTATE EXTRADITION AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
By

EUGENE COOK*

Since the first days of the Federal Union the problem
of defining and delimiting the sovereignty of the states has
occupied our courts, our Congress, and our legislatures,
and, sadly, even at times our armies. The concept of dual
sovereignty is an abstract one representing a compromise
between the conflicting principles of local autonomy and
national authority, and, like many another constitutional
principle, it has occasionally been restated and rearranged
to meet the demands of new and shifting governmental
philosophies.
Today, when state sovereignty has been diminished on
every side by the ever increasing power of the national
government, issues of state sovereignty, as such, do not
often provide the basis for litigation on constitutional
questions. The courts usually view the issue of sovereignty
from the other end of the telescope by inquiring not as to
what sovereignty the states have, but as to what they have
not and, therefore, cannot bar to the national government.
The reality of state sovereignty has been so thoroughly
covered by the web of thinly woven gossamers upon which
federal powers have been hung, as to have lost its sharp
outline. Yet it is still there, and on occasion the national
courts are wont to recognize not only its existence but its
almost forgotten eminence in the architecture of our governmental structure.
Recently a comparatively minor aspect of state sover*Attorney General of Georgia.
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eignty has given rise to a series of legal battles of unusual
bitterness and rancor; the sovereign right in question is
that of the state to demand the return of its escaped prisoners, convicted or accused, who have been apprehended in
other states.
What may be described as the distrust which some states
hold for the penal systems of other states in other geographical areas, together with the decreasing emphasis being
placed on state sovereignty by some federal courts, has led
to some amazing extremes in judicial efforts to prevent extradition of escaped prisoners to the states from which
they have fled.
The recent case of Dye v. Johnson' will serve as an example of the capacity of some courts to lend credibility to
any charge against the penological practices of southern
states. Before considering this case at length it will be well
to review the background of interstate extradition of escaped prisoners.
Nowhere in the Federal Constitution is the sovereign
power of the individual states more sharply outlined than
in those clauses providing for the return of escaped prisoners by the process of extradition. Article IV, Section II,
Clause II of the Federal Constitution provides:
"A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in
other State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."

or
anthe
the

This section of the Constitution has been implemented by
Federal statute.'
_...
U.S .......
, 70 S.Ct. 146, ..... L.Ed ......
, decided November 7,
1949, reversing Johnson v. Dye, 175 F. 2d 250 (2d Cir. 1949), and
affirming 71 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1948): "Whenever the executive authority of
any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from
justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an
indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any
State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having
committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic
1
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I. THE MECHANICS OF EXTRADITION
The mandate of the Constitution is clear, and the mechanics of interstate extradition are, therefore, quite simple. Upon proper demand made by the state from which
the fugitive escapes, the asylum state is required to deliver
up the fugitive. There is no provision for inquiry into the
merits of the accusation or conviction of the fugitive; certainly the framers of the Constitution would not seem to
have provided for the trial by one state of the penal or
judicial systems of another. Further, the federal courts
have, over the years, buttressed these limitations by declaring that the only issues open to inquiry are whether the
requisition papers are in order and whether the person
sought is in fact a fugitive.
However, if the extradition provisions of the Constitution are clear and inexorable, other provisions of the Constitution are of a more ductile nature. Lawyers and courts
faced with the bar set up by the extradition clause have
used the due process clause of the I 4 th Amendment to the
Constitution almost creatively in their efforts to combat
extradition of escaped prisoners. In recent years, through
repeated cases a certain pattern of procedure and strategy
on the part of the fugitives has grown up: A prisoner convicted or accused of a crime escapes confinement and flees
to another state. Upon re-arrest there and requisition being made by the governor of the state from which he escaped, the fugitive combats extradition before the governor
of the asylum state.
II.

THE DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR

Under the federal law the duty of the governor of the
asylum state is clear, but although the terms of the federal
by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory
from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has
fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the
executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such
authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the
fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no
such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest,
the prisoner may be discharged."
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statute are mandatory in form, the immunity from legal
compulsion granted the chief executive of a sovereign state
makes it impossible for the demanding state to force him
to render an escapee, if he refuses to do so. Various courts
have used unusually harsh language in criticizing governors who on proper cause shown have still refused to
execute the clear mandate of the Federal Constitution and
statutes:
"... The performance of this duty (the duty of a governor
to render a fugitive) however, is left to depend on the fidelity
of the state executive to the compact entered into with the other
states when it adopted the Constitution of the United States and
became a member of the Union. .

..

'"

The Constitutional provisions have been likened to a treaty
between sovereign nations,' and words heavy with moral
connotations have been applied when the governors of
various states have from time to time chosen to ignore the
clearly defined duties put upon them by such provisions.'

All judicial castigations and rebukes to the contrary,
when the governor of an asylum state refuses to render a
fugitive, such refusal effectively terminates the matter, and
the commands of the demanding governor are reminiscent

of King Canute's exhortations to the sea.
A different situation arises when the governor of the

asylum state grants the request of the demanding state and
issues his rendition warrant. If he follows the pattern, the
fugitive then makes application for writ of habeas corpus,
charging some or all of the following: That he was denied

a fair trial and that his conviction was illegal; that he was
3. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 109, 16 L.Ed. 717, 730 (U.S.
1861).
4. Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227, 27 S.Ct. 122, 126,
51 L.Ed. 161, 163 (1906) : " . ..

(the obligation) is in the nature

of a treaty stipulation entered into for the purpose of securing a
prompt and efficient administration of the criminal laws of the
several states,-an object of the first concern to the people of the
entire country, and which each state is bound, in fidelity to the
Constitution, to recognize."
5. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 38 S. Ct. 41,
62 L.Ed. 193 (1917).

19-501
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subjected to cruel and unusual punishment while imprisoned
in the demanding state; that if returned to the demanding
state he will again be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment to the extent that he fears for his life and, for all of
these grounds, that his rights under the I 4 th Amendment
to the Federal Constitution have been and will be invaded.
The fugitive is immediately met with a fundamental
question, to wit: What tribunals are available to him for
the hearing of these charges and the granting of appropriate relief? Obviously habeas corpus is the remedy to be
used, but in which court-that of the asylum state, of the
demanding state, or of the federal government?
Notwithstanding the fact that interstate rendition is
made pursuant to an Act of Congress, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided in 1884, in Robb v. Connolly,"
that Congress in the passage of the Interstate Rendition
Act did not undertake to invest the judicial tribunals of the
United States with exclusive jurisdiction for the issuance
of writs of habeas corpus in such proceedings, and that it
was entirely proper for state courts to inquire into the
grounds upon which any person is restrained of his liberty
and to discharge him, notwithstanding the fact that the
alleged illegality of the detention may arise from a violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and
in connection with an interstate rendition. The writ, as
used in this field, to investigate the jurisdiction of the detaining authority in the asylum state, conforms to general
habeas corpus law. Specifically, state courts will investigate: (i) the correctness of the requisition papers; (2) the
relator's identity; (3) whether the relator is a fugitive; and
(4) whether a crime is substantially charged. The scope of
the hearing is restricted, no inquiry being made into conformity with due process of law or other jurisdictional defects in the proceedings which were had in the demanding
state. Vith minor exceptions, if it be shown that the restraining power acted within its authority, the writ must be
6.

111 U.S. 624, 4 S.Ct. 544, 28 L.Ed. 542 (1884).
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denied.7 This narrow scope of inquiry is not only a limita-

tion .upon state courts but applies with equal force to the
courts of the United States. In the famous case of Drew v.
Thaw,8 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the full bench,
in review of a decision initially rendered by the United
States Court for the District of New Hampshire, said:
... When, as here, the identity of the person, the fact that
he is a fugitive from justice, the demand in due form, the indictment by a grand jury for what it and the governor of New York
allege to be a crime in that state, and the reasonable possibility
that it may be such, all appear, the constitutionally required
surrender is not to be interfered with by the summary process of
habeas corpus upon speculations as to what ought to be the result
of a trial in the place where the Constitution provides for its
taking place. We regard it as too clear for lengthy discussion
that Thaw should be delivered up at once." '

To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court
in Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police.1" Biddinger earnestly contended that he had continued to be usually and
publicly a resident of the demanding state until the expiration allowed by the period of limitations on a prosecution
of a crime with which he was charged. He therefore insisted that he was not a fugitive. Mr. Justice Clark, speaking
for the full bench, said:
... This much, however, the decisions of this court make
clear: that the proceeding is a summary one, to be kept within
narrow bounds, not less for the protection of the liberty of the
citizen than in the public interest; that when the extradition
papers required by the statute are in the proper form the only
evidence sanctioned by this court as admissible on such a hearing
is such as tends to prove that the accused was not in the demanding state at the time the crime is alleged to have been committed ;
and frequently and emphatically, that defenses cannot be entertained on such a hearing, but must be re.erred for investigation
to the tr'al of the case in the courts of the demanding State.""
7. Note, Habeas Corpus in Interstate Rendition, 47 COL. L. REV. 470
(1947).
8. 235 U.S. 432, 35 S.Ct. 137, 59 L.Ed. 302 (1914).
9. Id. at 440.
10. 245 U.S. 128, 38 S.Ct. 41, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917).
11. Id. at 135.
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As is pointed out in the Columbia Law Review article
above cited," the only relief which the asylum state can give
is unsatisfactory, because it is both drastic and inconclusive.
It is drastic, because if the accused is not turned over, he
must be freed; and it is inconclusive, because the demanding state can still pursue him in every other state in the
union. Moreover, these issues are matters more appropriately determined in the state where the alleged crime was
committed. If no trial has been had and prospective denial
of due process is urged as a basis for release, certainly the
demanding state should be allowed to assume control.
Where there has been a trial, such errors are remediable
there by the ordinary means of retrial or appeal or, if their
statutory period has elapsed, by writ of error coram nobis
or habeas corpus in the state courts.
The remedy provided by state courts being admittedly
incomplete and unsatisfactory, the applicants for the writ
have naturally turned to the federal courts. Here they have
collided with the definite trend of the federal judiciary towards withholding jurisdiction of applications for habeas
corpus until state remedies have been exhausted. No rule
has been more clearly stated nor more stringently enforced
than that enunciated by Ex parte Hawk' to the effect that
federal jurisdiction of habeas corpus applications may not
be had until state remedies have been exhausted. Yet, in
Johnson v. Dye," Circuit Judge Biggs, speaking for the
majority, concluded that it was unnecessary in an extradition case to exhaust state remedies. In reaching this conclusion he stated that the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Superintendent,5 to the effect that the writ may be allowed
by either state or federal courts to review the action of the
chief executive of the asylum state, was overruled sub
silentio in Powell v. Meyer. " The court thereupon proceeded to overrule Powell v. Meyer and to adhere to the
12. Supra note 7.
13. 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 (1944).
14. 175 F. 2d 250 (2d Cir. 1949) ; see note 1 supra.
15. 111 F. 2d 409 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 662 (1940).
16. 147 F. 2d 606 (3d Cir. 1945).
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ruling in United States ex rel. Darcy v. Superintendent. It
is pertinent to review briefly the Darcy case and the Powell
case.
In the Darcy case, Circuit Judge Maris stated:
The Supreme Court has construed this act (Interstate
Rendition Act) as placing the burden upon the governor of the
asylum state to determine, before complying with the demand,
whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a
crime and whether he is a fugitive from justice. This determination may be made by the governor without a hearing, but if the
alleged fugitive considers himself aggrieved by the order he may
obtain a hear:ng upon writ of habeas corpus. The writ may be
allowed either by a state or a federal court.'"

With respect to the scope of review, however, Circuit
Judge Mars quoted Mr. Justice Holmes in Drew v. Thaw
-the same excerpt above cited-and said of that decision
that the statement quoted ". . . epitomizes our conclusion
in the present case and indicates why it is impossible for
us to consider the relator's contention that his prosecution
in California is pressed to punish him for his political views
and activities rather than for the crime averred in the indictment.""8 Further, in the same connection, the Court
stated :
"... The duty of the court reviewing the status of the case
upon habeas corpus is quite restricted.""u

Powell v. Meyer dealt with a case where Georgia sought
rendition from New Jersey and the applicant for habeas
corpus insisted that he should be discharged upon the writ
for the reason that he was denied equal protection of laws
in the Georgia trial. The court very promptly concluded
that this was no ground for his discharge in the New Jersey
courts unless he showed that he had exhausted his remedies
under state law. Powell did not seek to review the extradition proceedings. By way of explanation of the court's action in the Powell case, Circuit Judge Biggs stated that the
17. 111 F. 2d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 1940) ; see note 15 supra.
18. Id. at 412.
19. Ibid.
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Court there followed the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
Sanderlin v. Sniyth.20 In speaking of the Sanderlin case, he

states:
The
that case the
the petitioner
usual rule of

Sanderlin case, however, was not in point for in
application for habeas corpus was made to release
from a sentence imposed by a state court and the
'2
exhaustion of state remedies necessarily applied. '

The decision in Johnson v. Dyc, holding that state reme-

dies need not be exhausted in applications for habeas corpus arising from extradition proceedings, was flatly overruled by the Supreme Court.22
This latter decision was based on Ex parte Hawk, which
held that the federal courts were not open to persons seeking the writ of habeas corpus until state remedies had been
exhausted. This decision was subsequently codified 2: ; as part
of the efforts of the federal judiciary to gain relief from the
great flood of applications for the writ which had in recent
years clogged the federal system."
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Johnson v. Dye operated to engraft an exception
upon the rule laid down in Ex parte Hawk. The decision of
the Supreme Court on the appeal of that case seemed to put
this question to rest, and properly so. It should be noted
that even under Ex parte Hawk and the new Judicial Code,
the federal courts are still open to the petitioner who claims
the absence of available state corrective process, or who
alleges the existence of circumstances rendering such
processes ineffective to protect his rights. 2 Neither of these

exceptions, however, has yet been effectively used by fugitives combating extradition, nor would they seem to be
applicable when the prisoners are escapees from the State
138 F. 2d 729 (4th Cir. 1943).
175 F. 2d 250, 257 (2d Cir. 1949) ;see note 1 supra.
See note 1 supra.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948).
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171
(1949).
25. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98
A.L.R. 406 (1935).
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. I

of Georgia, for the Constitution of the State of Georgia of
1877 and the Constitution of 1945 provide that the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended." Further, this provision of the State Constitution has been implemented by
statute. :

III.

REMAINING QUESTIONS

Although the question of the proper court would seem

to have been finally answered by Dye v. Johnson, there still
remain important questions as to the invasion of constitutional rights of fugitives by demanding states.
Basically, the question of whether or not the provisions
of the 8th Amendment to the Federal Constitution are
brought forward by the i 4 th Amendment has not been
definitively answered. It has long been held that the first
eight amendments to the Constitution are not, as such, incorporated in the I 4 th Amendment. The most recent consideration of this more general question was in the case of
Wolf v. Colorado.5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for
the court, stated:
". .. The notion that the 'due process of law' guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight
amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them

has been rejected by this Court again and again, after impressive
consideration. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U. S. 278; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319. The issue

is closed." ' '

However, as was pointed out in the Court of Appeals'
decision of Johnson v. Dye, the Supreme Court has upon
occasion held that the due process clause of the i 4 th
GA. CONST. Art. I, § I, Para. XI (1877) ; GA. CONST. Art. I, § I,
Para. XI (1945); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-111 (1948 Rev.).
27. GA. CODE § 50-101 et seq. (1933).
26.

28 ......
U.S .......
69 S.Ct. 1359,. .....
L.Ed .......
(1949).
29. 69 S.Ct. at 1360.

1950]

INTERSTATE EXTRADITION

Amendment includes by implementation the protection of
certain "basic" and "fundamental" rights."
The Third Circuit flatly held that the 14th Amendment
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by
a state, holding that the right to be free from such punishment is such a basic and fundamental right as to warrant
i 4 th Amendment protection. To date this decision has not
been specifically refuted. In the light of the fact that Johnson v. Dye has been summarily reversed by the Supreme
Court on other grounds, and the additional fact that the
Supreme Court has so emphatically denied the proposition
that the i 4 th Amendment includes the first eight amendments, this holding in Johnson v. Dye certainly cannot be
said to have closed the question, but it seems safe to predict that it will arise again.
IV.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTS
OF ITS EMPLOYEES

A further remaining question is that of the degree of
responsibility of a state for the illegal acts of its employees.
It is regrettable but foreseeable that from time to time such
employees may illegally punish or assault prisoners. The
question is: Shall such acts be considered official state actions, or merely violations committed outside the scope of
official authority? The Supreme Court of Georgia has decided that where an employee of the prison system of Georgia illegally punishes a prisoner, the prisoner is not entitled to freedom, although the employee inflicting the
punishment is, of course, subject to prosecution for his
wrongful act.'
There is language in the Third Circuit decision of Johnson v. Dye, however, which would seem to indicate that
where a prisoner is cruelly treated by a prison employee,
30.

31.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288
(1937) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed.
716 (1940) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53
L.Ed. 97 (1908) ; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448,
44 L.Ed. 597 (1900) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954,
83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939).
Loeb v. Jennings, 133 Ga. 796, 67 S.E. 188 (1910).
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such cruel treatment operates as a full pardon of the prisoner. Such a startling conclusion can hardly be legally supported, but along with the question of the enlargement of
the 8th Amendment mentioned above, it stands as a loose
end to the Third Circuit decision in the Johnson case. The
famous Screws case is certainly authority to the effect that
a state officer acting illegally may still be operating under
the cloak of official authority,' 2 but the proposition that the

state is bound by such acts is the converse of the holding in
the Screws case. Again it is safe to predict that this question
must be answered eventually.
V.

CONCLUSION

It seems safe to predict that these and other questions
affecting both the rights of the states and the rights of the
individual prisoners will be presented for consideration in
the near future. It is to be hoped that the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Dye v. Johnson fore-

shadows a return to the recognition of state sovereignty in
its original sharp outline. The questions at issue go far
beyond the welfare of an individual prisoner, for they in
fact affect the rights of all states and, hence, all citizens.
Without arguing the question of sovereign statehood versus
centralized government it may be safely stated that a return to state sovereignty is at least in keeping with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the Constitutional tradition of this country.

32.

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed.
1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330 (1945).

